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Abstract 
This paper describes a trivial, but highly effective 
denial of service attack based on commonly available 
IEEE 802.11 hardware and freely available software. 
The attack requires limited resources and is 
inexpensive to mount. This paper will discuss the 
attack, its implementation, and provide an analysis of 
methods to achieve optimal denial of service results. 
While there is currently no defense against this type of 
attack, the paper also discusses possibilities for attack 
mitigation. 
1. Introduction 
The IEEE 802.11 standards [I] specify the Medium 
Access Control (MAC) and Physical (PHY) layer 
requirements for Wireless Local Area Networking 
(WLAN). Acceptance of this standard has led to 
widespread adoption of WLAN technology as a 
supplement to, and in some cases a replacement for, 
wired networking infrastructure in the enterprise office 
environment. The success of the deployment of this 
technology in the enterprise environment has lead to a 
range of sectors that traditionally use proprietary radio 
technology, to consider how the affordable IEEE 
802.11 based devices might be applied to their 
communications needs. 
1.1. Emerging IEEE 802.11 Applications 
The specification by the IEEE of the 802.11 
wireless LAN standards has led to the emergence of a 
wide range of affordable, and to a large extent 
interoperable, technology becoming available for 
wireless communications. The availability of 
affordable wireless communications technology has 
not evaded the attention of a number of sectors that 
have traditionalJy relied on expensive, proprietary 
radio technologies to meet their communications 
0-7803-8246-3/04/$17.00 © 2004 IEEE. 
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needs. Such sectors include transportation, process 
control, and telecommunications. 
For example Alcatel, a large provider of control 
technologies to the transport sector, is including 
802.11 based radios in their technology strategy [2] 
and is reportedly using COTS based IEEE 802.11 
radios for trains in Las Vegas, Hong Kong, and 
Koreal• There also appears to be interest in the 
industrial networking arena for using commodity 
802.11 data radios in a range of applications'; 
consideration of WLAN technology for use by the 
military'; public safer; and the interworking of 
WLAN and 3G systems . 
This emerging interest in adopting IEEE 802.11 
technology for environments that have stringent 
performance and security requirements, especially in 
safety-critical control environments, is very concerning 
in lieu of the ease with which such communications 
can be disrupted, as described in Section 4. While 
attacks on the confidentiality and integrity of WLAN 
communications can be expected to be resolved in 
current and future enhancements to the standards -
attacks on availability as described in this paper may 
not be so easily solved. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First 
existing confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
attacks against IEEE 802.11 based WLANs are 
summarized in Section 2. Aspects of the MAC and 
PHY layer protocols relevant to the newly described 
attack are reviewed in Section 3 and the new attack is 
described in Section 4. The new attack is analyzed in 
Section 5 and possible solutions to existing and this 
new attack are discussed in Section 6. Conclusions are 
presented in Section 7. 
I See http://www. tsd. org/cbtc/projects/ 
2 See htt:p: / /ethernet. industrial­
networking.com/wireless.htm 
3 See Joint Tactical Radio System 
http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/jtrs/ 
4 See IEEE Communications, Volume: 4], Issue: 11, 
Nov. 2003 for articles on the integration of wireless LAN and 3G 
wireless. 
2. Existing Attacks against IEEE 802.11 
Since becoming standardized and in subsequent 
years, a number of attacks, both theoretical and 
practical have been described against IEEE 802.11 
networks. The attacks either focus on the 
confidentiality and integrity of wireless 
communications, or the availability of the wireless 
networking infrastructure. 
Significant attacks against the security services 
provided by the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
protocols are well documented [3.5]. A range of 
availability attacks, mainly directed at the management 
and MAC protocols used by IEEE 802.11 WLANs 
have also been identified [6, 7]. These attacks 
generally exploit the fact that many of the management 
messages in IEEE 802.11 are unauthenticated, rather 
they rely on correctly' behaving MAC layer 
implementations. Some example attacks involve: 
• Identity spoofmg to permit deauthentication 
or disassociation of the victim node from the 
network (See Figure 1); 
• Exploiting power saving features; and 
• Exploiting media access protocols through 
such activities as modifying backoff timers, 
and keeping network allocation vectors 
(NA V) at non zero values. 
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Figure 1. Authentication and association 
states [1] 
While each of these attacks is significant to varying 
degrees, it is the opinion of the authors that there are 
likely to be solutions to these types of attacks through 
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the judicious application of cryptographic techniques 
such as the authentication of messages'. 
3. Review of IEEE 802.11 Protocols 
The IEEE 802.11 working group standards detail 
information about the physical layer (PHY) and 
Medium Access Control layer (MAC) protocols 
required for wireless local area networking (WLAN). 
The PHY layer is further divided into the Physical 
Layer Convergence Procedure (PLCP) sub layer' and 
the Physical Medium Dependent (PMD) sublayer as 
shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. PHY I MAC layers [1] 
The PHY layer provides the MAC layer with 
information about the availability of the underlying 
medium (carrier sense fimctions) and is involved with 
the reception and transmission of data. 
To provide distributed, but coordinated access to 
the shared wireless medium, the IEEE 802.11 MAC 
protocols perform Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 
Collision Avoidance (CSMAlCA). This strategy 
minimizes the likelihood of two stations transmitting 
simultaneously, resulting in a collision and subsequent 
corruption of data, while ensuring that the available 
bandwidth is effectively utilized. Fundamental to the 
functioning of CSMAlCA in the IEEE 802.11 MAC 
protocols is the Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) 
procedure performed by the PHY layer. 
3.1. Clear Channel Assessment 
The Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) is used by 
the MAC layer to determine (l) if the channel is clear 
for transmitting data, and (2) for determining when 
there is incoming data. 
5 IEEE 802.1li will address the security issues associated with WEP, 
but will not CUl'TeIltly address some of the availability attacks 
described. 
6 The use of this sublayer ensures that the MAC layer is not tightly 
coupled to a specific PMD 
Evaluation of CCA is made by the PHY layer and 
the resulting assessment is communicated to the MAC 
layer via the PHY-CCA.indicate service primitive. This 
primitive can either be set to IDLE, when the channel 
is assessed to be clear, or BUSY when the channel is 
assessed to be in use7, 
The IEEE 802.11 series of standards define the 
following Clear Channel Assessment modes: 
• CCA Mode 1 Energy above threshold. CCA 
shall report a busy medium upon detection of 
any energy above the ED threshold. 
• CCA Mode 2 Carrier sense only. CCA shall 
report a busy medium only upon detection of. 
DSSS signal. This signal may be above or 
below the ED threshold. 
• CCA Mode 3 Carrier sense with energy above 
threshold. CCA shall report a busy medium 
upon detection of a DSSS signal with energy 
above the ED threshold. 
• CCA Mode 4 Carrier sense with timer. CCA 
shall start a timer whose duration is 3.65ms and 
report a busy medium only upon the detection 
of a high rate PHY signal. CCA shall report 
IDLE medium after the timer expires and no 
high rate PHY signal is detected. The 3.65ms 
timeout is the longest duration possible for a 
5.5Mbitls PSDU. 
• CCA Mode 5 A combination of carrier sense 
and energy above threshold .. CCA shall report 
busy at least while a high rate PPDU with 
energy above the ED threshold is being 
received at the antenna. 
3.2. Medium Access Control 
The IEEE 802.11 standards specify both a 
centralized and distributed coordination function for 
controlling acceSS to the shared transmission medium 
in WLANs operating in infrastructure mode (BSS 
lESS). These are known as the Point Coordination 
Function (PCF) and the Distributed Coordination 
Function (DCF) respectively. The DCF is also used to 
permit the ordered sharing of network resourceS in ad 
hoc, or IBSS based WLAN s. 
The PCF is centrally controlled and operates by a 
master (the access point) polling slaves (the stations) 
7 The specific details of how this is achieved differ with each 
physical layer, but the process involves the detection of energy 
beyond some threshold (pMD_ED.indicate), or the acquiring of a 
valid code lock (PMD_CS.indicate) 
for any data they may have to transmit. This permits 
contention free access to the transmission medium and 
operates in a speak only when spoken to paradigm. 
The PCF mode of operation is not widely deployed, so 
is not discussed further in this paper. 
The DCF as its name suggests provides distributed, 
but coordinated access to the shared medium. In 
coordinating access to shared medium there are two 
goals: (1) pennit stations to conunence transmission 
with minimal delay; and (2) prevent two or more 
stations from transmitting simultaneously to avoid 
collisions and data corruption. In order to meet these 
goals the 802.11 standard specifies a listen before 
talking paradigm for communications medium access, 
such that a station can only transmit while no other 
station is transmitting. This achieved by having the 
station perfonn a carrier sense operation, in the fonn of 
a clear channel assessment (CCA) prior to transmitting 
any data. To minimize the likelihood of two stations 
sensing the medium idle simultaneously, the medium 
must be idle for a period of time known as an inter 
frame space (IFS) before transmission. Once the 
medium has been idle for at least the appropriate IFS 
time, a random backoff procedure is performed . 
further reducing the likelihood of two stations 
transmitting simultaneously (See Figure 3). The 
random backoff time is calculated as a function of the 
number of unsuccessful attempts to transmit an 
MPDU, such that as the offered load to the network 
increases, the larger the range of possible backoff time 
values becomes. 
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Figure 3. Inter frame spacing relationships [1] 
An additional IFS value is used by the DCF when 
frame transmission errors are detected. This value is 
known as the Extended IFS (EIFS) and it is the longest 
IFS value of all. 
3.3. Summary 
The important points to note from this section, are 
that the CCA is used by the MAC layer to determine if 
the transmission medium is available for data 
transmission. Whenever the MAC layer receives a 
S These values are PHY specific and the use of different IFS 
values allows simplistic prioritization of traffic to be perfonned. 
PHY -CCA.indicate(lDLE) it will wait for an IFS plus 
a random backoff time prior to transmitting. When the 
MAC layer receives a PHY -CCA.indicate(BUSY) 
service primitive from the PLCP layer it will defer 
from accessing the medium. The PRY layer uses 
energy detection, code detection, or some combination 
of the two to determine if the medium is busy and sets 
PHY-CCA.indicate accordingly. 
4. A New Attack on IEEE 802.11 
Here we propose a new attack on the IEEE 802.11 
WLAN protocols. The attack described permits a low 
powered, portable device such as a Compaq IPAQ, 
using a commonly available wireless networking card 
to significantly disrupt wireless network 
communications over a significant range, for a 
significant period of rime, in a manner that makes the 
identification and localization of the attacking node 
non-trivial. 
The attack exploits the Clear Channel Assessment 
(CCA) procedure used by all standards compliant 
hardware and causes all stations within range, both 
clients and access points, to permanently defer 
transmission of data. This is achieved by stimulating 
the CCA in a manner that the channel is always 
assessed to be busy, thus preventing the transmission 
of any data over the wireless network. 
Significant concerns are raised by this attack for a 
number of reasons, including: 
• Attack can be mounted using standard 
hardware and commonly used drivers; 
• Attack consumes limited resources on the 
attacking node, so is inexpensive to mount; 
• Vulnerability being exploited will not be 
mitigated by emerging MAC layer security 
enhancements i.e. IEEE 802.11 TGi; and 
• There is currently no defense against this type 
of attack for DSSS based' WLANs. 
4.1. Attack Description 
To facilitate correct MAC operation, the IEEE 
802.11 standard mandates that a Station Management 
Entity (SME) will be present and able to interrogate 
layer specific status and control layer specific 
parameters. The two layers controlled via the SME are 
the MAC Layer Management Entity (MLME) and the 
PHY Layer Management Entity (PLME). Interactions 
9 These are the high rate WLANs. 
among the management entities are depicted in Figure 
4. 
..... 
NO 
Figure 4. Station Management Entities (SME) 
[1] 
The attack described here takes advantage of an 
optional PLME service primitive" that places the 
network card in a test mode of operation capable of 
continuously transmitting a specified bit pattern on a 
given channel. 
Once the attacking node begins transmitting this 
pattern, all stations within range of the transmission, 
including AP's, will receive a PHY­
CCA.indicate(BUSY) assessment of the channel state 
until the attacking node is disabled. This results in 
clients of the network perceiving the AP as out of 
range. The effect of the attack, as observed in our 
experimentation is almost instantaneous. 
The following subsections details the affects of the 
attack on PLCP receive and transmit procedures based 
on preliminary experimentation. 
4.2. Affects of attack on the PLCP receive 
procedure 
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The affect of an attack against PLCP receive 
procedures is relevant where the attacking station is 
within range of a station, but out of range of the access 
point the station is associated with. In this case, 
beacons are successfully transmitted from the access 
point allowing stations to be associated and 
synchronized. The PLCP receive procedure is affected 
as follows for stations within range of an attacking 
node. 
1. The PLCP frame is transmitted by the 
attacking node while the media is idle. In this 
case, the CCA algorithm detects the carrier and 
the sync pattern is successfully detected (Figure 
6). The PLCP frame sent by an attacking node 
is received, but fails the CRC check. 
Observations made during preliminary testing 
10 PLME-DSSSTESTMODE.requcst 
confinned that PLCP frames received 
contained CRC errors. As the PLCP CRC test 
fails, CRC FAIL is returned and the state 
machine returns to R)CIDLE state as 
illustrated in Figure 6. 
2. The PLCP frame Is transmitted by the 
attacking node while a beacon frame or a 
frame from another station is being 
transmitted. The result of this is a collision, 
such that the sync pattern cannot be detected. 
The result is a loop where the CCA detects a 
carrier, sync pattern detection fails, resulting in 
a return to the state of R)CIDLE. Inevitably all 
beacon frames successfully transmitted will 
collide with frames transmitted by the attacker, 
resulting in disassociation from an access point 
in the attacked channel. 
Observations made during preliminary testing 
confinn that both conditions cause the station port 
status to change from "Connected to IBSS" to "Out of 
Range (ESS)". 
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Figure 5. PLCP receive procedure [1] 
Figure 6. PLCP receive state machine [1] 
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4.3. Affects of attack against the PLCP 
transmit procedure 
When using the DCF to coordinate data 
transmissions in either infrastructure (BSS) or ad hoc 
(lBSS) mode the following transmit procedure is 
followed by the PLCP layer (See Figure 7). 
Figure 7. PLCP transmit procedure [1) 
Prior to any tranSmISSIOn the PHY· 
CCA.indicate(IDLE) must be received by the MAC 
layer and appropriate IFS times must have elapsed. 
Once the channel is assessed to be clear, transmission 
of the PPDU is initiated by the MAC layer issuing the 
PHY _TXSTART.request(TXVECTOR) pnmlttve. 
The PLCP layer then sets PMD parameters such as the 
antennae to use, transmission rate and transmission 
power level. Transmission of the data is then 
commenced via the PMD_TXSTART.request 
primitive. Transmission tenninates when data transfer 
has completed, or the MAC layer issues a PHY· 
TXEND.request primitive. 
The denial of service attack described in this paper 
effects the PLCP transmit procedure directly and 
indirectly in the following ways. 
I. The attack occurs whilst a station is 
transmitting a frame. In this case the 
transmission was initiated successfully, but part 
of the transmission is corrupted due to the 
initiation of an attack. An acknowledgment for 
the transmitted frame will not be received 
resulting in retransmission and an increase of 
the contention windowll. 
Acknowledgment failure or the receipt of 
PHY -RXEND.indication errors will result in 
the deferral of transmissions for a period 
greater or equal to EIFS. The EIFS is used to 
resynchronize the station to the actual medium 
11 Backoff time is based on a random value between the minimum 
and maximum values ofthe contention window. 
state. such that reception of an error-free frame 
during EIFS, results in the resumption of 
normal medium access procedures using the 
DIFS and backoff timers. Because an error-free 
fiame is unlikely to be received, the station 
could remain in this state for the duration of the 
attack. 
In the event the station is able to 
resynchronize. subsequent retransmissions are 
not able to occur, as it is unlikely the station 
will receive a CCA.indicate(IDLE). 
2. The attack occurs whilst the station is Idle. 
The continuous transmission of data onto the 
shared media, by the attacking node, 
dramatically reduces the likelihood that any 
station will receive a CCA.indicate(IDLE) that 
is a prerequisite for any PLCP transmission to 
commence. 
As the media is sensed as busy during a 
backoff slot, the backoff procedure is 
suspended and the media must be sensed as idle 
for a period of time equal to the appropriate 
IFS12. 
Even if a station was able to assess 
CCA.indicate(IDLE), any transmissions from a 
station are likely to collide with those of the 
attacker resulting in the MAC layer backoff 
procedures being activated. 
The affect of the attack on PLCP transmission 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 8. 
4.4. Attack Implementation 
The attack was implemented on a laptop running 
Linux Fedora Core I and a Compaq iPAQ running 
Familiar Linux. Both implementations used the linux­
wlan-ng [8] drivers and PRISM based wireless 
network interface cards. 
The goal of the linux-wlan project is to develop a 
complete, standards based, wireless LAN system using 
the GNUlLinux operating system that provides a 
convenient interface to low level functionality of the 
PRISM based network cards. Low level configuration 
of the device is made possible via the user level 
application, wlanctl-ng p2req_Iow_level series of 
commands. These permit the manipulation of the 
management entities described in Section 4.1. 
12 DIFS if no errors have been detected, EIFS if errors have been 
detected. 
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Figure 8. Backoff procedure during attack 
5. Analysis 
The following subsections detail the procedures 
used to create the attack, and how the attack was 
tested. 
5.1. Accessing PLME-DSSSTESTMODE 
As discussed in Section 4, the attack described in 
this paper depends on being able to access the test 
mode of operation via the PLME. Our testing revealed 
that this service primitive is implemented in a range of 
Prism2 based WLAN cards from Intersil and can be 
aecessed programmatically via the wlan-ng drivers 
available for the Linux operating system. The network 
cards and drivers were tested on both desktop / laptop 
Intel PCs and a Compaq iPAQ 3750 running Familiar 
Linux. 
5.2. Setting up the Attack 
The follOWing procedure is based on specific 
implementations of PHY sub layer functionality 
available through the wlan-ng driver for PRISM-based 
WLAN cards. 
I. Lock station to a given chaimel: The station 
mode is set to WDS (specifies a repeater function 
in a wireless network), such that the channel is 
not changed back to an available channel it can 
associate to an AP. 
2. Set transmission cbannel: PHY services are 
used to change the current channel to the 
specified channel for the attack. 
3. Launch Attack: The station's continuous 
transmit test mode is activated, such that the 
station radio is put in a continuous transmission 
state. MPDUs containing a test data pattern are 
continually transmitted until the test is stopped. 
Preliminary testing was conducted on a limited 
number of PRISM, Orinoco and Aironet-based WLAN 
cards. The tests were successful in both indoor and 
outdoor environments. In particular, attacks on 
infrastructure mode wireless LANs were highly 
effective, resulting in total denial of service for all 
wireless stations associated on the channel being 
attacked. The tests conducted made use of a PCMCIA 
wireless LAN card with a transmission power of 
23mW. The attack range could be significantly 
improved through the increase of transmission power 
and high-gain antennas. The maximum transmission 
power, as licensed by the Australian Communications 
Authority, for DSSS on the ISM band (2.4Ghz) is 
limited at 4 Watts ElRP [9]. 
Experimentation confirmed that attacks performed 
near an access point significantly improve DOS 
results, as all associated stations are denied service. 
Attacks performed at long range from an access point 
are less successful at total denial of service, rather they 
are only successful at denying service to stations with 
range of the attacker. Ad hoc networks are more 
resilient to attack than infrastructure networks as they 
are only affected by attackers within range. An 
attacker is able to use open source tools such as 
"Airfarf,13 to locate access points to optimize the 
attack. 
This tool and others such as "Ethereal"" are able to 
detect attackers and their approximate location. 
Experimentation indicated that the januning attack 
disables these tools. 
6. Solutions 
The IEEE WLAN standards are dynamically 
evolving with new features and capabilities constantly 
under consideration. This section of the paper 
considers the iropact that these evolving features and 
capabilities are likely to have on the existing attacks 
against WLAN's described in Section 2 and the new 
availability attack described in Section 4. 
6.1. Existing Attacks 
The attacks described in Section 2 result from 
poorly designed security protocols and the inability of 
stations to distinguish between authentic or forged 
management frames. Significant efforts have been 
undertaken by the IEEE 802.11 TGi to rectifY the 
security issues that plagued WEP and they have 
JJ See http://airfart.sourceforge . net 
14 See http://www.ethereal.com 
specified a comprehensive security framework for 
providing significant security improvements to existing 
and future wireless LAN standards. The key 
management framework detailed by IEEE 802.l l i  can 
be used to ensure that management frames are 
authenticated and reduce the risk that the attacks 
described can be successfully mounted. 
6.Z. New Attack 
Unfortunately, while the security efforts of IEEE 
802.11 i are capable of mitigating the security risks 
presented by existing attacks against 802.11 based 
WLANs, they will not have any impact on the new 
attack described in this paper. Primarily because the 
802.11 i solutions are applicable at the MAC layer and 
the attack described in this paper operates at the PHY 
(PMD and PLCP) layer. 
It is worth noting that the attack described in this 
paper is dependent on the following: (I) access to an 
exposed low level interface capable of placing the 
attacking network card in DSSSTESTMODE; (2) the 
dependency of DSSSTESTMODE on the use of a 
DSSS PHY layer; and (3) the use of shared 
conununications channel. The capability of mounting 
this attack using next generation WLAN cards based 
on the IEEE 802.l l a  specification is uncertain. Firstly, 
these cards operate with a different PHY layer, based 
on Orthogonal Frequency Division MUltiplexing 
(OFDM) and there may not be accesS to a 
DSSSTESTMODE equivalent function in cards based 
on this standard. 
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While this paper has focused on the effect of the 
new attack on networks using contention based MAC 
protocols such as DCF, the contention free MAC 
protocols such as PCF will be vulnerable too as they 
depend on the same CCA procedure as DCF." 
A fundamental factor contributing to the 
effectiveness of this attack is the use of a shared 
communications channel. One strategy for making the 
attack more complex to mount would be to discard the 
shared conununications paradigm in favor of dedicated 
communications channels based on dynamically 
negotiated spreading sequences. This would result in 
an attacker having to iam each charmel independently 
or jam an entire frequency, increasing the power 
requirements to mount the attack and the risk of being 
detected and localized. 
15 The PCF is not widely implemented, so extensive testing 
using this mode of operation has not been performed. 
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper has presented a highly effective denial of 
service attack that can be mounted against IEEE 
802.11 WLANs using a DSSS PHY layer. The attack 
is significant as it can be "achieved using only 
commodity based hardware and software; has low 
power requirements; and can be executed with minimal 
chance of detection and localization. 
A critical observation that can be made from this 
work is that the presence of engineering modes of 
operation, such as the DSSSTESTMODE interface 
exploited by this attack, in production hardware can 
present significant security concerns. These concerns 
are most pronounced in network environments that 
rely on the correct behavior of participating nodes for 
continued operation. 
Future work will consider attack optimization 
strategies such as fine tuning the attacking node 
parameters, the use of external high gain antennae, and 
the use of increased power. I6 The ability of 
dynamically generated spreading sequences to increase 
resilience to the type of attack described in the paper 
will also be examined. 
Until adequate strategies are in place to mitigate the 
significant threat of denial of service in current IEEE 
802,11 DSSS WLAN technology, the application of 
this technology should be precluded from use in 
safety-critical environments which typically have 
stringent availability requirements. 
8. Acronyms 
AP 
BSS 
CCA 
CFP 
CSMA 
CA 
OCF 
D1FS 
DSSS 
EIFS 
ESS 
FHSS 
IBSS 
IFS 
MAC 
MLME 
PC 
PCF 
Access Point 
Basic Service Set 
Clear Channel Assessment 
Contention Free Period 
Carrier Sense Multiple Access 
Collision Avoidance 
Distributed Coordination Function 
DCF IFS 
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
Extended IFS 
Extended Service Set 
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum 
Independent Basic Service Set 
Inter Frame Space 
Medium Access Control 
MAC Layer Management Entity 
Point Coordinator 
Point Coordination Function 
I6 ACA permits transmission at up to 4 Watts EIRP. 
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POU 
PHY 
PIFS 
PLCP 
PLME 
PMO 
PPDU 
SIFS 
STA 
WOS 
WEP 
Protocol Data Unit 
Physical layer 
PCFIFS 
Physical Layer Convergence Procedure 
PHY Layer Management Entity 
Physical Media Dependent 
PLCP POU 
Short IFS 
Station 
Wireless Distribution System 
Wired Equivalent Privacy 
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